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Findings from an early 2008 World Public Opinion (WPO) survey in Iran1 suggest that 
the Iranian public is far from monolithic in how it views important political and social 
issues that will likely play prominent roles affecting the outcome of the upcoming 2009 
national elections. These findings also have considerable relevance for U.S. policy 
toward Iran during a period in which the U.S. government is exploring the possibility and 
usefulness of greater openness in its dealings with Iran. 
Using a statistical clustering technique called Latent Class Analysis, we have identified 
three separate opinion groups within the Iranian public on the basis of their differing 
degrees of support of the Iranian government on three measures contained in the WPO 
survey.2 All three measures, discussed below, tap the theoretical construct of "regime 
support." We have found that the three public groups identified by using these "regime 
support" measures mirror the diversity of views among Iran's political elites.  
We are able to label these groups as Conservatives, Moderates and Reformers by 
examining the patterns of responses to these measures in each group and by borrowing 
from the research on factions among Iran's political elites.3 In WPO's January 2008 
survey, we found that Conservatives comprised 45 percent of the total (N = approx. 319), 
compared to 24 percent for Moderates (N = approx. 168) and 18 percent for Reformers 
(N = approx. 124).4 The remaining 13 percent fell into a non-substantive, largely "no 
opinion" group (N = approx. 99). Demographically, Moderates and Reformers tend to be 
younger, better educated, have higher incomes, and live in larger urban areas than do 
Conservatives.  
The three measures of "regime support" -- The three major substantive groups within 
Iran's public are separated and defined by their sharp and consistent divergence on three 
WPO questions relating to support of the Iranian government ("regime support"): (1) 
Satisfaction with the Iranian election process, (2) support for a free press versus the 
government's right to censor destabilizing news, and (3) trust in Iran's national 
government. (See Table 1 in Appendix I for the exact wording of each of these 
questions.) On all three questions, support for the regime declines sharply and 
progressively from the highest regime support (Conservatives) to the least regime support 
(Reformers). For example, nearly all Conservatives (97%) trust the Iranian national 
government "most of the time," most Moderates (85%) trust it "some of the time," and 
most Reformers (64%) trust it "rarely" or "never." (See Table 1A in Appendix I) 
The three groups also differ in the assessment of the process by which authorities 
generally are elected in Iran: Most Conservatives (83%) and Moderates (70%) are 
satisfied with the Iranian election process, while most Reformers (74%) are clearly 
dissatisfied with it. This is an example of sharp divergence of Reformers from the 
majority views of Conservatives and Moderates (Table 1B).  
The three groups also differ considerably in their preferences on having media freedom 
versus the government's right to censor potentially destabilizing news. Conservatives 
favor the government's right to censor (by a 67-17% majority); Moderates are closely 
divided (48% for the government's right to censor vs. 39% for media freedom); and 
Reformists favor media freedom by a large 73-18 percent majority - a reversal of the 
preference shown by Conservatives (Table 1C).  
These sharp differences in basic attitudinal orientation among the three groups may partly 
reflect their differences in age, education and income. Majorities of both Moderates 
(58%) and Reformers (55%) are between 18-29 years of age, compared to 36 percent of 
Conservatives who fall into this youngest age group. Also, two-thirds or more of 
Moderates (66%) and Reformers (71%) have completed high school, compared to half of 
the Conservatives. (See Table 2) 
Additional issues on which these three distinct Iranian opinion groups diverge are 
discussed below. These include other questions relating to Iran's domestic institutions 
(e.g., approval of President Ahmadinejad) and perceptions of the United States and the 
American people. Two cases of "partial divergence" will also be examined, in which two 
of the groups, Moderates and Reformers, share fairly similar views on an issue, but these 
views differ sharply from those of the third group, Conservatives. An example of "partial 
divergence" is satisfaction with Iran's economy, in which a majority of Conservatives 
voice satisfaction while most Moderates and Reformers express dissatisfaction. Then a 
number of areas are examined in which the views of the three groups converge, including 
sizeable majority opposition within all groups to Iran developing nuclear weapons and 
predominant support within all groups to U.S.-Iranian governmental talks on a range of 
issues, including Iraq.  
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1 This survey is based on personal interviews with a representative sample of 710 Iranians 
ages 16 and older, interviewed by a local professional research organization between 
January 13 - February 9, 2008. Additional details on the survey are available on the 
World Public Opinion website.  
2 Latent Class Analysis (LCA) segments the sample into relatively homogeneous groups 
based on respondents' answers to three questions relating to "regime support". Additional 
details on our analytical approach are contained in Appendix IIA, Obtaining the Basic 
LCA Results.  
3 The labeling for each group is based on the response distributions within each group 
and the logic for our labels will become evident in our subsequent analyses in the main 
text. Our analytical discussion is focused on these three substantively important groups. 
A small fourth group (approximately 13% of the sample), characterized by scattered 
substantive responses and disproportionately high "Don't Know" responses, is ignored in 
order to concentrate on the main features of the public's political landscape. Although 
many researchers have written about the major political subdivisions or factions among 
the Iranian elites (see, for example, the works of Shahram Chubin, Akbar Ganji, and 
Sanam Vakil), comparable empirical analyses of the major political orientations in 
representative national samples of the Iranian public seem to be in short supply. Thus, our 
work aims to contribute to a better understanding of this aspect of the Iranian public.  
4 Our analytical strategy depends on examining patterns in the data rather than on 
constructing tests of significance using margins of error. Thus, most of the tables in 
Appendix I contain multiple, consistent measures of the single concept being addressed. 
Obtaining useful approximations of the margins of error (i.e., sampling errors) for our 
analyses covering each of the three substantive groups is not a simple process, requiring 
consideration of the multi-stage nature of the sampling design, as well as the magnitudes 
of the percentages and numerical size of each group being examined. Nevertheless, some 
very tentative indications of the possible margins of error can be derived by using 
computations based on a simple random sample formula and increasing the results by a 
factor of 1.41 to estimate the effects of the complex sampling design. Applying this 
admittedly arbitrary approach, the following margins of error are offered as tentative 
suggestions for the maximum variability at the 95 percent confidence level: 7.7% for 
Conservatives; 10.7% for Moderates; and 12.4% for Reformers.  
 
